Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Volume 4 | Issue 1

Article 6

2009

A Critical Analysis of the Bankruptcy Code's
Exception to Discharge for Debts Arising From
Wrongful Conduct
Matthew Harte

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl
Recommended Citation
Matthew Harte, A Critical Analysis of the Bankruptcy Code's Exception to Discharge for Debts Arising From Wrongful Conduct, 4 Brook. J.
Corp. Fin. & Com. L. (2009).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl/vol4/iss1/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

NOTES
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE’S EXCEPTION TO
DISCHARGE FOR DEBTS ARISING FROM
WRONGFUL CONDUCT
INTRODUCTION
While bankruptcy is intended to relieve the honest debtor,1 the
Bankruptcy Code (the Code) prevents the discharge of debts in certain
situations where the debtor’s actions are less than ethical.2 Section
523(a)(6) of the Code does not allow a debtor to discharge any debt “for
willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity.”3 The case law concerning the interpretation of
§ 523(a)(6) is not clear and in 2007, the Federal Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois noted a circuit split over the requirements for
the dischargeability of intentional breaches of contract in bankruptcy
proceedings. The bankruptcy court noted that there is disagreement between
the circuits over whether § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct for a debt to
be nondischargeable.4 While the text of § 523(a)(6) clearly requires a
willful and malicious injury,5 the Ninth and Fifth Circuits are divided as to
whether tortious conduct is required for an intentional breach of contract to
be nondischargeable.6 In the Ninth Circuit, for a breach of contract “to be
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) . . . [it] must be accompanied by
some form of tortious conduct that gives rise to willful and malicious
injury.”7 The Fifth Circuit, however, “holds that any breach of contract is
nondischargeable as a willful and malicious injury if the debtor either
intended to injure the other party to the contract by breaching it or if injury

1.
2.
3.
4.

Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 555 (1915).
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006).
§ 523(a)(6).
Tortious conduct is “[a]n act or omission that subjects the actor to liability under the
principles of tort law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (9th ed. 2009).
5. § 523(a)(6).
6. Wish Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Salvino, 373 B.R. 578, 588 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, No.
07-C-4756, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3918 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008). In addition to the split between
the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, the Tenth and Sixth Circuits are also split through unreported
decisions. Compare In re Best, 109 F. App’x 1 (6th Cir. 2004) (tortious conduct is necessary for a
debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(6)(a)) with Sanders v. Vaughn (In re Sanders), No. 996396, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5763 (10th Cir. Mar. 29, 2000) (tortious conduct is not necessary for
a debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(6)(a)).
7. Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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to the other party was substantially certain to result from the breach;
tortious conduct is not required.”8
Part I of this note will begin with an overview of the circuit split and its
origination out of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Kawaauhau v. Geiger.9 This overview will commence with a discussion of
Geiger, then analyze the competing interpretations developed by the Ninth
Circuit’s In re Jercich decision,10 and the Fifth Circuit’s In re Williams
decision.11 Part I will conclude with a brief explanation of Wish Acquisition,
L.L.C. v. Salvino,12 a bankruptcy case that noted the circuit split. Part II of
this note discusses the role of state regulation in the application of federal
bankruptcy law, specifically the § 523(a)(6) exception. Part III will
conclude the note with an analysis of the relevant issues and a
recommendation that the Ninth Circuit rule be adopted to resolve the circuit
split. The Ninth Circuit rule should be adopted because it is more protective
of debtors, more in line with the legislature’s intent concerning the
Bankruptcy Code, and is less susceptible to abuse by creditors or debtors.
I. CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Geiger gave rise to a circuit split
because the case merely addressed the issue of whether reckless or
negligent conduct could lead to a debt being nondischargeable.13 The Court
did not address the issue of what kind of intentional conduct was necessary
to invoke the § 523(a)(6) exceptions.14 Since the Court did not address what
constitutes a “willful and malicious injury” under § 523(a)(6), the Ninth and
Fifth Circuits developed competing interpretations.15 In 2007, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed the circuit
split and determined that the Ninth Circuit’s rule requiring tortious conduct
for a debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) should be applied in the
Seventh Circuit.16
A. KAWAAUHAU V. GEIGER
The circuit split recognized in Salvino arose out of competing
interpretations of the Geiger decision that determined the scope of
§ 523(a)(6).17 The Court held that “a debt arising from a medical
8. Salvino, 373 B.R. at 588 (citing Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re
Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 510 (5th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
10. 238 F.3d 1202.
11. 337 F.3d 504.
12. 373 B.R. 578.
13. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 64 (1998).
14. Id.
15. See In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1206; In re Williams, 337 F.3d at 510.
16. Salvino, 373 B.R. at 581.
17. See generally Geiger, 523 U.S. 57.
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malpractice judgment, attributable to negligent or reckless conduct,” was
dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) because the plaintiff was not the victim of a
willful or malicious injury.18 This suit arose when a plaintiff had her right
leg amputated below the knee after receiving treatment from her doctor for
a foot injury.19 The jury found the defendant liable for malpractice, and he
attempted to avoid the judgment by petitioning for bankruptcy.20 In
response to the defendant’s bankruptcy petition, the plaintiff requested that
the bankruptcy court hold the malpractice judgment nondischargeable
because the judgment originated from a willful and malicious injury and
was thus a debt excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).21
The bankruptcy court initially determined that the defendant’s conduct
was willful and malicious since his “treatment fell far below the appropriate
standard of care.”22 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
determination that the debt was nondischargeable, but the appellate court
reversed and determined that the malpractice debt was dischargeable.23 The
court of appeals reversed the district court’s determination because the
§ 523(a)(6) exception from discharge “is confined to debts based on what
the law has for generations called an intentional tort.”24
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the court of appeals and determined that willful, in the context of
§ 523(a)(6), modifies injury, “indicating that nondischargeability takes a
deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act
that leads to injury.”25 The Court justified a narrow reading of the statute by
asserting that if Congress had intended to “exempt debts resulting from
unintentionally inflicted injuries,” explicit language to make that meaning
clear would have been used.26 Further, the structure of the statute mirrors
that of intentional torts, in that “[i]ntentional torts generally require that the
actor intend ‘the consequences of an act,’ not simply ‘the act itself.’”27 If
the Court adopted a broad reading of § 523(a)(6), it would have expanded
the scope of the statute to cover many situations where “an act is
intentional, but injury is unintended,” including a knowing breach of
contract or a car accident.28 This type of broad reading would be
incompatible with the established notion that “exceptions to discharge

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 61 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 61–62 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. a (1964)).
Id. at 62.
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should be confined to those plainly expressed.”29 Finally, if the Court
adopted a broad understanding of willful and malicious it would have
rendered § 523(a)(9), which exempts debts from injuries or deaths arising
from drunk driving to be discharged, superfluous.30 Based on these factors,
the Court unanimously determined that § 523(a)(6) should be interpreted
narrowly, so that the statute only applies to a deliberate or intentional
injury.
In deciding Geiger, the Supreme Court clearly established that
§ 523(a)(6) exempted only deliberate or intentional injuries, and does not
cover intentional acts that result in injury.31 However, the Court did not
address the issue of whether the debtor’s conduct must be tortious to be
exempted under the statute. Both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits address this
issue, but are split on whether the debtor’s conduct must be tortious in
addition to willful and malicious for a debt to be nondischargeable.
B. PETRALIA V. JERCICH
After the Supreme Court in Geiger addressed one aspect of the
§ 523(a)(6) exception, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether
tortious conduct is required to invoke the exception. Its decision is the basis
for the Salvino decision. The dispute in Jercich arose when Jercich, the
owner of a real estate company, failed to pay one of his employees as
required under an employment contract.32 The employee sued Jercich
seeking damages.33 The state court found in favor of the employee and
while the appellate decision was pending, Jercich filed for bankruptcy.34
The employee initiated proceedings to except the judgment from discharge
under § 523(a)(6).35
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court found for Jercich and determined that
the debt was dischargeable.36 The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s decision because “where a debtor’s conduct constitutes
both a breach of contract and a tort, the debt resulting from that conduct
does not fit within § 523(a)(6) unless the liability for the tort is independent
of the liability on the contract.”37 The appellate panel determined that since

29. Id. (quoting Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2001).
33. Id. at 1204.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 243 B.R. 747, 751 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 238
F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2001).
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there was not a tort independent from the contract, the debt was not exempt
from discharge under § 523(a)(6).38
The Ninth Circuit reversed the appellate panel and held “that to be
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), a breach of contract must be
accompanied by some form of tortious conduct that gives rise to willful and
malicious injury.”39 In order for a breach of contract to become tortious
conduct it must “violate[] an independent duty arising from principles of
tort law.”40 Jercich’s nonpayment of wages to the employee when he had
the ability to do so was tortious conduct because it violated California
law.41 The Ninth Circuit determined that the “deliberate or intentional
injury” standard established by the Supreme Court in Geiger necessitates
tortious conduct, in addition to a “willful and malicious injury,” for a debt
to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).42
C. WILLIAMS V. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL

WORKERS LOCAL 520
While the Ninth Circuit determined that tortious conduct was required
for a debt to be deemed nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6),43 the Fifth
Circuit rejected the tortious conduct requirement and instead limited its
inquiry to a determination of whether the debtor’s conduct was willful and
malicious.44 The Fifth Circuit held in Williams “that for a debt to be
nondischargeable, a debtor must have acted with objective substantial
certainty or subjective motive to inflict injury.”45
The conflict in Williams arose out of a violation of a collective
bargaining agreement and a subsequent agreement between an electrical
contractor and a union for electricians. Williams, the electrical contractor,
hired electricians for a commercial project who concealed their union
affiliation and went on strike.46 After being unable to hire non-union
electricians, Williams entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
the Union.47 Finding trouble with the union electricians, Williams, in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement, hired non-union
electricians.48 In response to the violation, the Union initiated a grievance
38. Id.
39. In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1206 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. (quoting Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal.
1994)).
41. Id. at 1207.
42. See id. at 1205.
43. Id.
44. See Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 510
(5th Cir. 2003).
45. Id. at 508–09 (citing Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir.
1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 507.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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against Williams.49 The dispute was resolved when Williams agreed to use
only union electricians for commercial projects.50 The new agreement was
subsequently violated and the Union sought damages from both Williams’
original violation of the collective bargaining agreement and his later
violation of the new agreement.51 Williams then filed for bankruptcy, and
the Union sought to have the debts under the collective bargaining
agreement and the subsequent agreement excepted from the discharge under
§ 523(a)(6).52
The bankruptcy court determined that the debts under the collective
bargaining agreement were nondischargeable because they “arose from
willful and malicious injury.”53 After the judgment was affirmed by the
district court,54 the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the bankruptcy court’s
determination that tortious conduct is not required for a debt to be
nondischargeable.55 In rejecting the requirement of tortious conduct, the
circuit court condensed the test for a willful or malicious injury “into a
single inquiry of whether there exists either an objective substantial
certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm on the part of the
debtor.”56 This test requires that “a debtor must commit an intentional or
substantially certain injury in order to be deprived of a discharge.”57 Under
this rule, “the dischargeability of contractual debts under [§] 523(a)(6)
depends upon the knowledge and intent of the debtor at the time of the
breach.”58
Though the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination
that tortious conduct is not required for a debt to be nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6), it did not fully affirm the decision of the bankruptcy court.59
The Fifth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court’s determination that the
damages resulting from Williams’ violation of the collective bargaining
agreement were nondischargeable.60 Williams may have acted intentionally
in hiring non-union electricians, but he was not intending to harm the Union
through this action; he was acting to finish the project and to save his
business.61 The Union did not introduce any evidence that when Williams
breached the collective bargaining agreement he “was substantially certain
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 510 (citing Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 823 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Id. at 509 (citing Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir.
1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 510.
59. Id. at 513.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 510.
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the Union would sustain a blow to its prestige and its ability to uphold its
contracts.”62 Since there was no showing that Williams intended or was
substantially certain to cause injury to the Union through his violation of
the collective bargaining agreement, the debt was dischargeable.63
The circuit court also affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination
that Williams’ violation of the agreement led to nondischargeable
damages.64 It is well established that “[f]ailure to obey a court order
constitutes willful and malicious conduct, and a judgment against a defiant
debtor is excepted from discharge.”65 Since Williams failed to follow the
court order, his conduct was at least substantially certain to cause injury to
the Union and therefore the damages resulting from his breach of the
agreement were nondischargeable.66 This ruling interprets Geiger to mean
tortious conduct is not required to invoke the § 523(a)(6) exception to
discharge, and instead only requires conduct that was intentionally
undergone, or substantially certain, to cause injury.67
D. WISH ACQUISITION, L.L.C. V. SALVINO
The Ninth and Fifth Circuit’s debate concerning the requirement of tortious
conduct in the § 523(a)(6) exception has influenced other courts not within
their jurisdiction. For example, in Wish Acquisition L.L.C. v. Salvino, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois sided with the Ninth
Circuit’s determination that tortious conduct was required to invoke the
§ 523(a)(6) exception.68 In this case, Salvino, the debtor, owed Wish
Acquisition (Wish), his former employer, debts that were nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(6) for the intentional breach of his employment contract.69
The conflict arose after Wish acquired Salvino’s medical practice and the
practice subsequently defaulted on its loans.70 When Wish acquired the
practice, it entered into an employment contract with Salvino which
provided that Wish would “forgive all but $1.5 million of Salvino’s
personal guaranty of the bank loan” in exchange for Salvino’s medical
services.71 Salvino, before filing for bankruptcy, breached his employment
contract by seeking other employment, making him liable to repay the $1.5

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 511.
Id.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 512 (citing PRP Wine Int’l v. Allison (In re Allison), 176 B.R. 60, 64 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1994)).
66. Id. at 513.
67. See id. at 509.
68. Wish Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Salvino, 373 B.R. 578, 581 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, No.
07-C-4756, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3918 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 582.
71. Id. at 583.
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million under a liquidated damages provision in the employment contract.72
The court determined that Salvino’s debts were dischargeable because Wish
was unable to show that Salvino’s intentional breach of contract resulted in
a willful and malicious injury.73
In deciding this case, the bankruptcy court adopted the Ninth Circuit’s
rule that “the willful and malicious injury exception [of § 523(a)(6)] applies
only to claims arising from tortious conduct, not from simple breaches of
contract.”74 The first reason the court gave in deciding to adopt the Ninth
Circuit rule requiring tortious conduct was due to the use of the phrase
“willful and malicious injury” in § 523(a)(6).75 Using the terms “willful and
malicious” implies that the exception is limited to tortious conduct.76
Therefore, “only debts arising from the sort of conduct that the common
law discourages by punitive damages” would be nondischargeable.77
Second, the court stated that before § 523(a)(6) was enacted, there was a
willful and malicious injury exception from the discharge of debts that
applied only when tortious conduct was present.78 Since Congress enacted
§ 523(a)(6) with the willful and malicious standard, the court presumed that
Congress meant to continue the practice of limiting the application of the
exception to tortious conduct.79 Third, the court concluded that if a broad
understanding of willful and malicious conduct was adopted under
§ 523(a)(6), it would include debts generally discharged in bankruptcy.80
Finally, the court reasoned that if all intentional breaches of contract were
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), then it would come into conflict with
§ 365 of the Code.81 Section 365 encourages, in certain circumstances,
intentional breaches that will generally harm the other party.82 Therefore, if
§ 523(a)(6) did not require tortious conduct, the Code would punish
conduct that it encourages elsewhere.83
In this case, Salvino’s breach of his employment contract was not a
willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) since the breach itself was
not tortious.84 Salvino owed Wish $1.5 million,85 but this money was

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 582–84.
Id. at 581.
Id.
Id. at 589.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.; see also In re Barton, 465 F. Supp. 918, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (limiting willful and
malicious injury “to cases sounding in tort, not in contract”).
79. Salvino, 373 B.R. at 590.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 591.
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006).
83. Salvino, 373 B.R. at 591.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 586–87.
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contract debt and did not arise from an independent violation of tort law.86
The breach was not tortious because the contract was a private agreement
and an intentional breach of contract does not give rise to liability under tort
law.87 Additionally, since § 523(a)(6) is not based on contract principles and
instead is grounded in tort law, “[i]t is designed to compensate the injured
party for the injury suffered while not allowing the debtor to escape liability
for a willful and malicious injury by resort to the bankruptcy laws.”88 Since
the purpose of § 523(a)(6) is to compensate an injured creditor, “the
appropriate measure for non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(6) is an
amount equal to the injury caused by the debtor rather than any other sum
owed by the debtor on a contractual basis.”89 Though Salvino’s conduct was
intentional, his breach of the contract was not tortious and therefore his debt
was dischargeable under the Code.90
While the Supreme Court in Geiger managed to clarify one aspect of
the § 523(a)(6) exception, the Court failed to answer the question of
whether tortious conduct is a prerequisite for a debt to be nondischargeable
under the section. This failure has led to competing interpretations by the
Ninth and Fifth Circuits that have affected other areas of the law. The
differing interpretations of § 523(a)(6) by the Ninth and Fifth Circuits of
whether tortious conduct is required for a debt to be nondischargeable has
resulted in state and federal common law having conflicting roles in
understanding the exception.
II. BANKRUPTCY LAW WITHIN THE FEDERAL AND STATE
STATUTORY LANDSCAPE
Since the Ninth and Fifth Circuit rules require differing reliance on state
and federal common law, it is necessary to place § 523(a)(6) in the broader
legal context and understand the competing authority of federal and state
governments in establishing bankruptcy standards. The Code occupies a
unique place in American jurisprudence in that it is federal law that allows
the states to establish competing interpretations, especially concerning
exemptions.91 Though bankruptcy law does allow for some state
regulation,92 when there is a conflict between the federal and state laws,
86. See id. at 592.
87. Id.
88. Friendly Fin. Serv. Mid-City, Inc. v. Modicue (In re Modicue), 926 F.2d 452, 453 (5th Cir.
1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id.
90. See Salvino, 373 B.R. at 592.
91. For examples of such exemptions, see New York’s personal property exemption statute
and Texas’ personal property exemption statute. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205 (McKinney 2009); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 2007).
92. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2006) (defining property as “any property that is
exempt under federal law . . . or state or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the
petition . . .”).
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federal law will govern.93 The federal government has authority to regulate
bankruptcy as outlined in the Bankruptcy Clause, which gives the federal
government the authority to enact “uniform [l]aws on the subject of
[b]ankruptcies throughout the United States.”94 Despite this clear provision,
there has been some debate over the proper scope of federal authority in
bankruptcy.
A. DEFINING THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF STATE LAW IN
BANKRUPTCY DETERMINATIONS
Despite the fact that the Constitution clearly establishes the federal
government as having authority concerning the enactment of uniform
bankruptcy laws, the individual states have always had a role to play in
bankruptcy.95 In Butner v. United States, the Supreme Court explicitly
recognized the role of the states in bankruptcy determinations.96 The Court
advocated limited federal authority in bankruptcy cases by representing the
legal truism that unless there is conflicting federal regulation, state law
governs.97 The Supreme Court espoused and established the notion that
state bankruptcy laws are only preempted when there is actual conflict with
the federal regulation provided by the Code.98 The dispute in Butner
centered on competing claims for rents collected between the filing of
bankruptcy and foreclosure between a bankruptcy trustee and a second
mortgagee.99 When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it did not intend
to determine whether the state law was properly applied.100 Instead, the
Court was concerned with whether the federal statutes that govern the
administration of bankrupt estates were correctly interpreted.101 Since state
law defines and creates property interests, unless there is “some federal
interest [that] requires a different result, there is no reason why such
interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party
is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”102 The Court sought to ensure the
uniform treatment of property within a state, regardless of whether the suit
was in federal or state courts, “to reduce uncertainty . . . discourage forum
shopping, and . . . prevent a party from receiving ‘a windfall merely by

93. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
95. See, e.g., Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co. v. Weinstein (In re Hallenberg-Wagner Motor
Co.), 119 F.2d 120, 122 (8th Cir. 1941) (“In this circuit the law is settled that the construction of
mortgages is governed by local state law.”).
96. See generally Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
97. See id. at 54.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 49.
100. Id. at 51.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 55.
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reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’”103 The Court in Butner held
that “the federal bankruptcy court should take whatever steps are necessary
to ensure that the mortgagee is afforded in federal bankruptcy court the
same protection he would have under state law if no bankruptcy had
ensued.”104
Since Butner was decided,105 there has been movement in the federal
bankruptcy courts to rely on federal common law for definitional purposes
to ensure uniformity among the states.106 The basic premise of Butner holds
true, but its scope has been limited to a definitional role, with the federal
courts increasingly relying on federal common law, rather than state law, to
settle any ambiguities in the Code.107
B. THE SHIFT TO USING FEDERAL COMMON LAW TO DEFINE
TERMS THAT ARE AT ISSUE
While not directly contradicting the truism found in Butner, the Court
in United States v. Craft shifted away from the dominance of state
definitions in the application of federal bankruptcy law, and instead focused
on using federal common law to define relevant terms.108 In Craft, the Court
was concerned with “whether a tenant by the entirety possesses ‘property’
or ‘rights to property’ to which a federal tax lien may attach.”109 The Court
determined that the tenant by the entirety possessed “property” or “rights to
property” for the purposes of federal law, and while the state may make a
different choice concerning state creditors, that choice is not binding on
federal courts.110 Instead, federal courts should “look initially to state law to
determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government
seeks to reach, [and] then to federal law to determine whether the
taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as property or rights to property
within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.”111 Craft did not
completely reject the truism found in Butner, but instead, merely

103. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
104. Id. at 56.
105. The decision in Butner has been superceded by the new bankruptcy code, however
“Butner’s core principles remain ‘good law,’ as it has been re-articulated by the High Court since
the advent of the Bankruptcy Code.” See In re Pruitt, 401 B.R. 546, 564 (2009).
106. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278–79 (2002) (“State law determines only
which sticks are in a person’s bundle. Whether those sticks qualify as ‘property’ for purposes of
the federal tax lien statute is a question of federal law.”).
107. See id. at 288 (state law definition of property rejected in favor of a definition from federal
common law); see also Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 330 (2005) (state law is not even
mentioned in the analysis when the Court is filling in blanks in the Bankruptcy Code).
108. See Craft, 535 U.S. at 288.
109. Id. at 276.
110. Id. at 288.
111. Id. at 278 (quoting Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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represented a movement toward the establishment of a federal common law
defining the scope of the Code.112
C. THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN DETERMINING
THE APPLICABILITY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
Expanding on the conception of a federal common law for definitional
purposes as envisaged by Craft, the Supreme Court later firmly established
that the question of whether a debt is dischargeable is a separate federal
inquiry that should take place in bankruptcy court, not earlier in state court
when the nondischargeability of debts is not at issue.113 In Archer v.
Warner, the Warners agreed to pay the Archers in order to settle a fraud
claim.114 However, after the Warners missed their first payment, they filed
for bankruptcy.115 The Archers claimed that the Warners’ debt was
nondischargeable because it was for money obtained by fraud.116 The
bankruptcy court, district court, and the court of appeals denied the
Archers’ claim and determined that the debt was dischargeable.117 The
Supreme Court reversed stating that “the mere fact that a conscientious
creditor has previously reduced his claim to judgment should not bar further
inquiry into the true nature of the debt.”118 Archer definitively settled the
issue that the bankruptcy court can weigh all evidence by looking beyond
the record of state court proceedings when determining whether a debt is
nondischargeable.119 Yet, in Rousey v. Jacoway, the Court did not expand
on the notion of a federal common law existing for definitional purposes as
Archer did. Instead, Rousey is merely a recent example of federal common
law being applied to a bankruptcy exemption.120 The Court in Rousey asked
“whether debtors can exempt assets in their Individual Retirement Accounts
(“IRAs”) from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 522(d)(10)(E).”121 The
§ 522(d)(10)(E) exemption allows a debtor to remove his right to receive “a
payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar
plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of
service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and
any dependent of the debtor” from the bankruptcy estate.122 The bankruptcy
court, the bankruptcy appellate panel, and the court of appeals determined
112. See id. at 288.
113. Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 321 (2003) (citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 134
(1979)).
114. Id. at 317.
115. Id. at 317–18.
116. Id. at 318.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 320–21 (quoting Brown, 442 U.S. at 138) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. See id. at 321 (citing Brown, 442 U.S. at 138–39).
120. See generally Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (2005).
121. Id. at 322.
122. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (2006).
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that the debtors’ right to payment did not meet all of the statutory factors.
Therefore, the IRAs were not exempt from the bankruptcy proceedings.123
The Supreme Court reversed and determined that IRAs could be exempted
from the bankruptcy estate under § 522(d)(10)(E).124
In the context of this note, Rousey is not important for the decision
itself, but rather for how it was reached. When the Court determined that
the exemption applied, the Court did not consider state law, relying on an
analysis grounded in federal common law.125 Specifically the Court noted
that the Code did not define the relevant terms, and looked “to the ordinary
meaning of [those] terms” within the federal common law instead of state
law.126 Rousey illustrates the scope of the Archer expansion by
demonstrating that the application of federal common law extended beyond
the applicability of bankruptcy law in general and instead is applicable in
defining exemption terms.
III. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES IN DECIDING THE CIRCUIT
SPLIT
Though the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ interpretations necessitate
different roles concerning the incorporation of federal and state common
law into § 523(a)(6), the differing reliance on either federal or state
common law does not make either interpretation fundamentally unsound.
However, the Ninth Circuit rule is superior because it is more protective of
debtors, is supported by the legislature’s drafting intent, and is not subject
to abuse by creditors or debtors.
A. NINTH CIRCUIT RULE AND THE ROLE OF STATE AND FEDERAL
COMMON LAW
The Ninth Circuit rule concerning the nondischargeability of debts
under § 523(a)(6) is a fundamentally sound statutory interpretation, but,
since tortious conduct is not defined within the Code, there is conflict over
whether state or federal common law should define the term.127 Depending
on which standard is adopted, different conduct will be excepted from
discharge under the Ninth Circuit rule. If courts apply the truism from
Butner, state law will define what constitutes tortious conduct.128 However,

123. Rousey, 544 U.S. at 324–25.
124. Id. at 326.
125. See id. at 327–32 (analyzing whether the debtor’s right to payment meets the requirements
of the § 522(d)(10)(E) exception without invoking, or even mentioning state law, and instead
relying on a purely federal analysis).
126. Id. at 330.
127. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2006).
128. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 n.9 (1979) (“[S]tate laws are thus suspended only
to the extent of actual conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress.”).
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if the courts apply the reasoning found in Craft or Archer, the courts will
look to federal common law to define tortious conduct.129
While the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution would
generally govern this conflict of competing interpretations, a determination
of what constitutes tortious conduct is an activity generally left to the
states.130 Traditionally, states have been granted the authority to establish
tort law because the determination of what constitutes tortious conduct is
representative of a public policy decision to regulate.131 In addition to
tradition, defining what conduct is tortious should be left to the states so as
to ensure the uniform application of bankruptcy law by both state and
federal courts within a state. This will reduce uncertainty over what conduct
is exempted, discourage forum shopping by debtors and creditors, and
prevent a party from being benefited because the action is a bankruptcy
proceeding.132
Furthermore, the federal definition of “tortious conduct” is
inappropriate in the application of § 523(a)(6) because unlike Craft, there is
no predefined common law since the Code does not define the term tortious
conduct.133 And while Archer may expand on the federal definitional power
found in Craft, it does so by requiring a federal inquiry in bankruptcy court
when the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy is at issue.134 This inquiry
does not require the application of state or federal common law to define a
term, but merely ensures that bankruptcy courts weigh all of the evidence
when determining if a debt is nondischargeable.135 Defining what
constitutes tortious conduct must be done on the state level in order to
ensure that local interests are represented in a uniform manner within the
state.136 In turn, this will necessitate reliance on the Butner Court’s decision
to incorporate state tort law into the Code.
Following the Butner Court’s rationale may be disconcerting because it
could lead to a different application and analysis of claims grounded in
bankruptcy on a state-by-state basis. For example, in the hypothetical state

129. See Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 321 (2003); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278
(2002).
130. HENRY COHEN & VANESSA K. BURROWS, FEDERAL TORT REFORM LEGISLATION:
CONSTITUTIONALITY AND SUMMARIES OF SELECTED STATUTES, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS
(July 7, 2008), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/
95797_07072008.pdf (“Tort law at present is almost exclusively state law rather than federal
law.”).
131. See Retherford v. AT&T Commc’n, 844 P.2d 949, 974 (Utah 1992) (“The common law of
tort expresses public policy . . . .”).
132. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2006); see Craft, 535 U.S. at 283 (explaining that the language of
26 U.S.C. § 6321 is broad and shows congressional intent to reach all the property a taxpayer may
have).
134. See Archer, 538 U.S. at 321.
135. See id.
136. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
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of Guntopia, suppose there is a law exempting all responsibility for harm
caused by firing a gun on one’s own property. The Ninth Circuit rule, under
the Butner standard, would allow someone who damaged another’s
property, with a gun used on their own property, to avoid the debt.137 While
this is an extreme example, it illustrates that reliance on the Butner standard
could result in disparate treatment among the states for determining whether
debts can be discharged in bankruptcy. Ultimately, this concern does not
amount to much when one looks at how the Ninth Circuit rule has been
applied. For example, in the Jercich decision, the court looked to California
law to determine whether the nonpayment of wages by an employer was
tortious conduct.138 Though adoption of the Ninth Circuit rule could lead to
confusion over whether state law or federal common law defines tortious
conduct, the traditional exertion of power by the state, coupled with the
general adoption of state standards by the bankruptcy courts, means that the
state law definition of tortious conduct would be adopted.
While the requirement of tortious conduct being read into § 523(a)(6)
could lead to conflict between state and federal law, the Butner truism
effectively limits that conflict even when viewed in light of the expansive
federal common law established by Craft and Archer.
B. FIFTH CIRCUIT RULE AND THE ROLE OF STATE AND FEDERAL
COMMON LAW
Unlike the Ninth Circuit rule, the Fifth Circuit rule found in Williams
invites the adoption of federal common law to define the terms. The Fifth
Circuit rule requires that the “debtor must have acted with objective
substantial certainty or subjective motive to inflict injury.”139 This test relies
on definitional terms that can be uniformly adopted among the states, and
therefore, there are no negative consequences with the adoption of a federal
standard. The requirements of “objective substantial certainty” and
“subjective motive” can be easily defined by federal common law so as to
ensure uniformity in the application of bankruptcy law.140 Similar to the
137. The injury to property that would occur from an individual firing a gun on their own
property would be dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) even if the individual acted in a willful and
malicious manner because the state has determined that the individual’s conduct is not
blameworthy. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2006).
138. See Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Jett v.
Sicroff (In re Sicroff), 401 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2005) (looking to California state law to
determine that the libelous statements made by the debtor were tortious conduct making the
damages nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6)), amended by, No. 03-15610, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5919 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2005).
139. Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 509 (5th
Cir. 2003) (citing Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1998))
(internal quotations omitted).
140. The reason these terms can be adopted easily on a federal level is because they are terms of
art that are used in a consistent manner among the states. The term “objective substantial
certainty” is applied in the same manner by the Fifth Circuit and in a bankruptcy court in Ohio.
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rationale by the Court in Rousey, the terms found in the Fifth Circuit test
can be easily defined by looking to the ordinary meaning of those terms.141
In addition to Rousey, the Court in Archer established that federal common
law could be used to define terms in bankruptcy.142 The adoption of federal
common law to define the terms found in the Fifth Circuit test is
appropriate because of the uniform nature of the terms and the interest in
establishing uniform application of the law among the states.
While the Fifth Circuit rule embraces the modern trend of using federal
common law in interpreting the Code, there is concern that the test is not
fundamentally sound since it conflates the willful and malicious
requirement. The Fifth Circuit, relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Geiger, determined that § 523(a)(6) creates an implied malice
standard, and that “[a] debtor acts with implied malice when he acts with
the actual intent to cause injury.”143 While it is possible that the Fifth
Circuit could rely on the vagueness of the statute to justify its implied
malice standard, since the fact that the statute reads “willful and malicious”
could be interpreted as meaning that the injury be both willful and
malicious, the statute could also be disjunctive and refer to a “willful
injury” or a “malicious injury” as being adequate for an exception from
discharge. However, the conflation misconstrues both the nature and the
plain language of the Geiger decision, which did not address whether the
doctor’s conduct was malicious and merely focused on whether the doctor
caused a willful injury to the patient.144 Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit
has noted, conflating the willful and malicious standards of § 523(a)(6)
contravenes established precedent.145 Since the Supreme Court did not
address the malicious requirement in Geiger, the Fifth Circuit has

See, e.g., Berry v. Vollbracht (In re Vollbracht), 276 F. App’x. 360, 361 (5th Cir. 2007) (defining
“objective substantial certainty” as an objective test where the court looks at whether the debtor’s
actions were at least substantially certain to result in injury); J. Bowers Constr. Co. v. Williams (In
re Williams), 233 B.R. 398, (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) (the “objective substantial certainty” test
was applied in an objective manner where the court looked at whether the debtor’s actions in
withdrawing funds from a joint savings account were intended to cause injury to the plaintiff). In
addition to the consistent treatment of “objective substantial certainty,” the term “subjective
motive” is also treated in a consistent manner amongst the various states. See, e.g., Berry, 276 F.
App’x at 362 (“subjective motive” is used to determine whether the debtor’s intentional actions
were intended to cause harm to the plaintiff); Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Powers (In re
Powers), 227 B.R. 73, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998) (the “subjective motive” test “requires [courts]
to focus on the subjective intent of the debtor to determine whether the injury was intended or
unintended”). This is in contrast to “tortious conduct,” a term that the individual states have vested
interests in defining. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
141. See Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 330 (2005).
142. See Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 321 (2003).
143. In re Williams, 337 F.3d at 509 (quoting In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 606) (internal quotations
omitted).
144. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998).
145. Jett v. Sicroff (In re Sicroff), 401 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by, No. 0315610, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5919 (9th Cir. April 11, 2005).
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misconstrued that case’s interpretation of § 523(a)(6) by conflating the
willful and malicious standard into a single test.146
The fact that the Ninth Circuit rule relies on state common law to define
tortious conduct, and the Fifth Circuit rule relies on federal common law to
define its terms does not affect the soundness of the rules. Though there
could be some concern that the Ninth Circuit rule is an example of judicial
rule making, this concern is unfounded because its interpretation can be
reconciled with the statute’s legislative history and the rules of statutory
construction.147 On the other hand, there is serious concern that the Fifth
Circuit’s conflation of the willful and malicious injury requirement into a
single test comes into conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in Geiger
and established precedent. Though this conflict does not make the Fifth
Circuit rule fundamentally unsound, it does make the Ninth Circuit rule
more attractive.
C. PROTECTIVE OF DEBTORS
In addition to the Ninth Circuit rule being a more attractive rule for
constructionary reasons, the Ninth Circuit rule is also more protective of
debtors. It is well established in the United States that the purpose of
bankruptcy is “to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.”148 The fresh start
afforded to the honest debtor gives the debtor “a new opportunity in life and
a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt.”149 However, the policy for relief in
bankruptcy being accorded to the honest debtor is not absolute and “the
fresh start [policy of the Code] does not extend to an in rem claim against
property but is limited to a discharge of personal liability.”150

146. It is possible, however, that the Supreme Court has implicitly approved of the Fifth
Circuit’s condensing of the malice and willful requirements, since the Court denied certiorari to
Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1998), the case that established
the implied malice standard. See Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 526 U.S. 1016 (1999).
Nevertheless, this result is a stretch and is reading too much into the Court’s decision to deny
certiorari. United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1922) (“The denial of a writ of certiorari
imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case . . . .”). Even though the Fifth Circuit
rule misreads the Court’s decision in Geiger by conflating the willful and malicious requirements,
it is not clear that the rule is not fundamentally sound since Geiger merely focused on what
constituted an intentional injury and did not address what constituted a malicious injury. See
Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61.
147. See infra the subsequent discussion concerning the role of legislative history and the rules
of statutory construction in Part III.D.
148. Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915).
149. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
150. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 416 (1992).
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While it was clear as early as 1915 that the purpose of the Code was to
give the honest debtor a fresh start,151 before the enactment of the Code
reform in 1978 secured creditors were able to abuse the system at the
debtors’ expense.152 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 took steps to
prevent abuse by creditors and the wide-sweeping changes resulted in the
Code having a pro-debtor bias.153 Yet, many of the amendments to the Code
after 1978 have been passed to level the playing field, and even in some
instances, favor creditors in bankruptcy.154 Despite “the policy winds
hav[ing] turned angrily from the dew-dropping pro[-]debtor south to the
frozen bosom of the pro[-]creditor north,”155 the fundamental purpose of the
Code remains the same: to give the honest debtor a fresh start.156
The Ninth Circuit rule is more protective of debtors and is more lenient
in allowing them to discharge their debts in bankruptcy proceedings. As
shown in Jercich and Salvino, the Ninth Circuit rule only prevents debts
from being dischargeable when the debtor has intentionally and maliciously
caused injury to the creditor through tortious conduct.157 By requiring
tortious conduct in addition to a malicious and willful injury, the Ninth
Circuit rule makes it harder for debtors to have their debts declared
nondischargeable.158 In addition to being protective of debtors, the
requirement of tortious conduct involves a determination of the debtor’s
“honesty,” or his blameworthiness, thus making the rule congruent with the
purpose of bankruptcy.159 For example, in Jercich, the debtor was
“dishonest” because he breached California public policy in failing to pay
the wages of one of his employees and therefore his debt was
nondischargeable,160 while the debtor in Salvino was “honest” because an
intentional breach of an employment contract was not a violation of Illinois
public policy.161 The Ninth Circuit rule serves the fundamental purpose of

151. See id.; Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. at 555.
152. See David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1055, 1065–66 (1998) (“Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, secured
creditors ruled the sea like so many pirates, boarding distressed debtor vessels to expropriate
cargo, forcing these debtors to scuttle themselves.”).
153. See id. at 1064.
154. Id. (for example, see 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(3) (2006), which was originally added in 1994,
and strongly favors creditors at the expense of debtors).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Martin v. Bajgar (In re Bajgar), 104 F.3d 495, 501 (1st Cir. 1997).
157. Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001); Wish Acquisition,
L.L.C. v. Salvino, 373 B.R. 578, 581 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, No. 07-C-4756, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3918 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008).
158. See, e.g., Salvino, 373 B.R. at 592 (although Salvino falsely represented the fact that he
intended to work for Wish, his breach of contract was not tortious).
159. See Retherford v. AT&T Commc’n, 844 P.2d 949, 974 (Utah 1992) (tort law is an
expression of public policy).
160. In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1206–07.
161. Salvino, 373 B.R. at 592.
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bankruptcy by protecting honest debtors and preventing dishonest debtors
from discharging their debts.162
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit rule that combines the willful and
malicious injury requirement into a single determination of whether the
debtor “acted with objective substantial certainty or subjective motive to
inflict injury” is not protective of debtors.163 By conflating the willful and
malicious requirements, the Fifth Circuit rule requires a single
determination of whether a debtor’s conduct can be nondischargeable. In
addition to the rule being easily satisfied, the Fifth Circuit rule does not
make any attempt to distinguish between an honest and dishonest debtor.164
By failing to incorporate any degree of blameworthiness into the
determination, the Fifth Circuit rule is as likely to allow a dishonest debtor
to discharge her debts as to prevent an honest debtor from doing so.
While the Fifth Circuit rule provides debtors some protection by
requiring intentional action on the part of the debtor, the Ninth Circuit rule
is more protective by having multiple elements and a determination of
blameworthiness through the requirement of tortious conduct. The Ninth
Circuit rule is better because it is more protective of debtors in general, and
more importantly, it makes an effort to protect honest debtors in accordance
with the purpose of the Code.
D. INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE
Besides being more protective of debtors, the Ninth Circuit rule is more
in line with the intent of the legislature and the rules of statutory
construction. Concerning the passage of amendments to the Code, “[w]hen
Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write on a clean slate.”165
This means that modifications to the Code do not replace established case
law; instead, amendments are understood in light of previous interpretations
except where the common law is explicitly overruled.166 Further, when
there is a dearth of discussion concerning a modification to existing case
law in the legislative history, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
interpret an amendment to the Code that contradicts a pre-Code practice.167
In practice, when a provision of the Code “is coherent and consistent, there
generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the
162. See In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1206.
163. Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 509 (5th
Cir. 2003) (citing Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1998))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
164. See, e.g., Red v. Baum (In re Red), 96 F. App’x 229, 231 (5th Cir. 2004). Despite the fact
that the debtor’s act of running a car into a crowded bar constituted tortious conduct, the court did
not address the debtor’s blameworthiness in holding his debt nondischargeable and instead
focused on whether the debtor’s actions were objectively certain to cause harm. Id.
165. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991).
167. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419.
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statute.”168 But, when interpreting a provision of the Code that is open to
some interpretation, the court may look to legislative history and the preCode practice.169
Section 523(a)(6) may not be facially ambiguous, but given the
divergent treatment among the circuits, it is necessary to look at earlier
practice and the legislative history to determine whether tortious conduct is
required.170 Looking at the practice of the judiciary before § 523(a)(6) was
added to the Code, the Ninth Circuit rule is more in line with past practice.
Before § 523(a)(6) was codified in 1978, § 17(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 had a willful and malicious injury exception from discharge that
applied only where there was tortious conduct.171 By voluntarily reenacting
the willful and malicious injury requirement for nondischargeability from
the old § 17(a)(8) into § 523(a)(6), it is safe to assume that Congress
intended to continue limiting the application of this exception to tortious
conduct.172 This assumption comes from the fact that “Congress is
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without
change.”173 Since the language of the old bankruptcy exception found in
§ 17(a)(8) is the same as the current language found in
§ 523(a)(6),174 unless there is contrary language in the legislative history the
requirement of tortious conduct will continue unabated.175 Additionally,
when a common law principle is firmly established, like the requirement of
tortious conduct to invoke the willful and malicious injury exception, “the
courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation
that the principle will apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary
is evident.”176
Looking to the legislative history, the Ninth Circuit rule is congruent
with established rules of statutory construction. The legislative history of
§ 523(a)(6) merely discusses that the Supreme Court’s ruling in a prior case
had been overruled.177 Therefore, “willful” means intentional or

168.
169.
170.
171.

United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989).
See id. at 246.
See id.
Wish Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Salvino, 373 B.R. 578, 589 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, No.
07-C-4756, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3918 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008).
172. See id. at 590.
173. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
174. Salvino, 373 B.R. at 589 (“[B]efore the enactment of § 523(a)(6) in the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code, a ‘willful and malicious injury’ exception from discharge was set out in § 17(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and was applied only in situations of tortious conduct.”).
175. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991).
176. Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
177. In the legislative changes concerning § 523(a)(6), the only change mentioned is that the
Supreme Court case Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1902), was overruled. See S. REP. NO. 95989, at 79 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865.
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deliberate.178 However, there is nothing in the legislative history suggesting
that the scope of the § 523(a)(6) exception has been expanded to cover
claims of malicious and willful injury that do not involve an independent
tort action.179 Further, when discussing the modifications to
§ 523 generally, the legislative discussion makes no mention of
§ 523(a)(6),180 and where there is no discussion it is likely that the pre-Code
practice is still applicable.181 Since there is no discussion in the legislative
history of modifying § 523(a)(6) to cover claims of malicious and willful
injury that do not involve an independent tort action, the Ninth Circuit rule
should be adopted.
It is necessary to look at the pervasiveness of past practice and
legislative history to determine whether the prior practice is still the current
rule under the Code, because the modification of the Code does not occur
on a clean slate.182 Past practice will govern unless there is clear intent
either in the statute or in the legislative history to overrule the past
practice.183 When Congress adopted the language of § 17(a)(8) without
modifying it or discussing changes, the case law requiring tortious conduct
for a debt to be nondischargeable still governed. Since the Fifth Circuit rule
does not require tortious conduct and the Ninth Circuit rule does, the Ninth
Circuit rule is more harmonious with the rules of legislative history and
statutory construction.
E. ABUSE BY THE DEBTOR AND THE CREDITOR
Beyond being more protective of debtors and more in line with
legislative intent, the Ninth Circuit rule cannot be as easily manipulated by
either party for an unfair advantage while the Fifth Circuit rule can be easily
abused by a creditor. While the underlying purpose of the Code, in allowing
the honest debtor to start afresh, is pro-debtor,184 bankruptcy does not
unduly favor debtors at the expense of creditors.185 Given this dichotomy, it
becomes necessary to interpret the Code in such a manner that creditors do
not lose their rights but debtors are protected in accordance with the
purpose of the Code.186 Although it is true that the balancing of debtors and
178. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 79.
179. See id. (does not mention modifying the statute to no longer require tortious conduct).
180. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, sec. 2522, 104 Stat. 4789, 4865–66
(1990) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 523 (2006)).
181. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992) (Without discussion in the legislative
history, the Court has been reluctant to adopt an interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code that would
“effect a major change in pre-Code practice . . . .”).
182. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991).
183. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419.
184. See Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 555 (1915).
185. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2006) (exceptions to discharge).
186. See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 834 (1987) (stating bankruptcy policy is vague and mysterious
where “bankruptcy judges have a general mandate to do equity, but not too much equity”).
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creditors rights in an equitable manner can result in abuse of the system, the
fact that bankruptcy is an alternative avenue for the vindication of legal
rights exacerbates the possibility of forum shopping.187
Since “[t]here is no virtue in giving parties an incentive to engage in
forum shopping for its own sake,” it becomes necessary to establish
exception rules that do not encourage pursuing an action in bankruptcy over
other legitimate legal avenues.188 One method of limiting forum shopping in
bankruptcy is to ensure that debtor/creditor rights outside of bankruptcy
match those rights within bankruptcy.189 By keeping the rights in
bankruptcy and alternative legal avenues congruent, the ability of parties to
misbehave is severely limited.190 This method is superior to granting judges
discretion to police the conduct of parties since judges are human, and
therefore, prone to error.191 By establishing congruent policies in and out of
bankruptcy, courts can limit forum shopping and other abuses by parties.
The Ninth Circuit rule limits opportunities to forum shop by ensuring
that legal rights that are protected outside of bankruptcy are protected
during bankruptcy proceedings. By exempting tortious conduct from
discharge, the Ninth Circuit rule establishes a bankruptcy policy grounded
in legal rights. This congruent policy in the context of § 523(a)(6) ensures
that violators of public policy are held responsible for the harm they
cause.192 By ensuring that violators of public policy are responsible for the
harm they cause no matter what the legal proceeding, the Ninth Circuit rule
does not provide an incentive for the debtor to enter into bankruptcy and
gives the creditor no reason to force the debtor into bankruptcy.193 Since the
Ninth Circuit rule ensures congruence between rights in and out of
bankruptcy, the rule is appropriately classified as a neutral rule into and out
of bankruptcy.194
Though the Ninth Circuit rule ensures congruent analysis of conduct,
there is concern that in practice a dishonest debtor might be able to abuse
the rule to avoid his obligations to his creditor. For example, allowing the
doctor in Salvino to avoid the debts arising out of his intentional breach of
contract seems to be an abuse of the Code, since it allows a dishonest debtor
187.
188.
189.
190.

See id. at 824–27.
Id. at 827.
See id. at 822.
See id. at 821 (when a party has an incentive to misbehave controlling their conduct is
inherently difficult, but eliminating that incentive makes that party easier to police).
191. Id. (“Allowing someone to gamble with someone else’s money is always a bad idea, even
when a conscientious judge is looking over the gambler’s shoulder.”).
192. See, e.g., Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2001) (Jercich
was unable to avoid damages owed through non-payment of wages to his employee even though
he filed for bankruptcy).
193. See Baird, supra note 186, at 827 (“There is no virtue in giving parties an incentive to
engage in forum shopping for its own sake.”).
194. The Ninth Circuit rule is appropriately classified as a neutral rule into and out of
bankruptcy since it does not encourage forum shopping by either the debtor or the creditor.
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to swindle his creditor and escape his obligations.195 Despite the doctor’s
dishonesty, his conduct is more correctly classified as an intentional breach
of contract done to offset further economic loss.196 The doctor’s conduct
may have been underhanded, but it was merely a breach of an agreement
between private parties and did not implicate the public policy concerns
underlying tort law.197 Since Salvino did not violate any public policy in
breaching his contract,198 he is not blameworthy, and therefore is an honest
debtor who is entitled to protection under the Code.199
By requiring tortious conduct for a debt to be nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6), the Ninth Circuit rule is firmly grounding willful and malicious
injury in tort law. By doing so, the Ninth Circuit is ensuring that each
challenge to the dischargeability of debts under § 523(a)(6) will be decided
on a case-by-case basis after a careful weighing of objective standards that
does not allow either the debtor or the creditor to use bankruptcy to their
own advantage at the expense of the other party.200
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit rule is not neutral concerning forum
shopping and has the effect of encouraging creditors to force debtors into
bankruptcy. This incentive results from the lack of a requirement of tortious
conduct in the determination of whether a debt is nondischargeable because
of a willful and malicious injury.201 Without the tortious conduct exception,
creditors who lack a valid tort claim, or whose judgment would be limited
in normal proceedings, have an incentive to push debtors into bankruptcy to
ensure payment. This incentive results because the Fifth Circuit rule is
easily satisfied and is sufficiently broad to cover a wide range of
misconduct, including intentional breaches of contract.202 For example,
under the Fifth Circuit rule, Salvino would have been unable to discharge
the debts resulting from the breach of his employment contract since he
intended, or was substantially certain, to injure the creditor.203 A creditor
under the Fifth Circuit rule would have the incentive to force a debtor like
Salvino into bankruptcy, so as to limit his remedies and ensure a prompt
judgment for payment.
195. See Wish Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Salvino, 373 B.R. 578, 592 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d,
No. 07-C-4756, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3918 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008).
196. See id.
197. See Retherford v. AT&T Commc’n, 844 P.2d 949, 974 (Utah 1992) (“The common law of
tort expresses public policy, the scope of which is not generally determined by reference to
privately contracted obligations.”).
198. Salvino, 373 B.R. at 592.
199. See Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 555 (1915).
200. See, e.g., Salvino, 373 B.R. at 588–92; Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202,
1206–09 (9th Cir. 2001) (examples of analysis under the Ninth Circuit rule on a case by case
basis), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 930 (2001).
201. See Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 510
(5th Cir. 2003).
202. See Salvino, 373 B.R. at 590.
203. See id. at 578.
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The Ninth Circuit rule is neutral as to the issue of forum shopping
because it ensures equal treatment of parties in and out of bankruptcy
proceedings, thus ensuring that neither party will seek the bankruptcy arena
in search of a windfall.204 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit rule does not
mandate similar application of the law within bankruptcy and other legal
proceedings resulting in an incentive for creditors to engage in forum
shopping.205 The Ninth Circuit’s rule is superior to the Fifth Circuit’s
approach because, instead of merely giving judges additional authority to
police abuses, it eliminates incentives to engage in forum shopping.206
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit rule requiring tortious conduct for a debt to be
nondischargeable should be universally adopted since it is more protective
of debtors, more consistent with the legislative history of the statute, can be
reconciled with the rules of statutory construction, and is less likely to result
in forum shopping by both the debtor and the creditor. As Bankruptcy
Judge Wedoff notes in Salvino, the use of the phrase “willful and malicious
injury” suggests that the exception is limited to tortious conduct, that the
legislative history seems to necessitate a finding of a tortious conduct
requirement, that without a tortious conduct requirement the exception
would become too broad and contravene the purpose of the Code, and that
there would be conflicts between clauses of the Code if tortious conduct
was not required.207 Interpreting § 523(a)(6) to require tortious conduct is
more protective of debtors because it is more difficult to satisfy and is
harmonious with the overarching purpose of the Code.208 This interpretation
is also more consistent with the intent of the legislature because past
practice and the rules of statutory construction necessitate a finding that
tortious conduct is required to invoke the willful and malicious injury
exception.209 The Ninth Circuit rule will result in less forum shopping by
either party as it ensures the equal application of law whether the action is a
bankruptcy proceeding or not.210 Since the fundamental purpose of the Code
is to allow the honest debtor to start afresh211 and the Ninth Circuit clearly
fulfills that function, it should be universally adopted throughout the United
States.

204. See Baird, supra note 186, at 825.
205. See id. at 818 (“In a world in which workers enjoy a special priority only in bankruptcy,
creditors will strive to resolve their differences outside of bankruptcy.”).
206. Id. at 821.
207. See Salvino, 373 B.R. at 589–91.
208. See Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915) (the purpose of
bankruptcy is to allow an “honest debtor” to “start afresh”).
209. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992).
210. See Baird, supra note 186, at 822.
211. See Williams, 236 U.S. at 555.
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